Counterinsurgency force ratio: strategic utility or nominal necessity

  title={Counterinsurgency force ratio: strategic utility or nominal necessity},
  author={Riley M. Moore},
  journal={Small Wars \& Insurgencies},
  pages={857 - 878}
  • Riley M. Moore
  • Published 1 October 2013
  • Political Science
  • Small Wars & Insurgencies
As a consequence of intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, force ratio for counterinsurgency (COIN) has come under increased scrutiny. Reduced to its essence, the issue is simply, ‘How many troops does it take to get the job done?’ This answer has been sought by the US military, academia, and think tanks. There have been numerous responses, culminating in several ‘plug-and-play’ equations for minimum force ratios in COIN operations. Due to the impossibility of determining precisely how many… 
3 Citations
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