Countering Coups: Leadership Succession Rules in Dictatorships

@article{Frantz2017CounteringCL,
  title={Countering Coups: Leadership Succession Rules in Dictatorships},
  author={Erica Frantz and Elizabeth A. Stein},
  journal={Comparative Political Studies},
  year={2017},
  volume={50},
  pages={935 - 962}
}
Paradoxically, many dictators agree to institutionalized succession rules even though these rules could regulate their removal from office. This study shows that succession rules, like other pseudo-democratic institutions in authoritarian regimes, provide survival benefits for dictators. Specifically, they protect dictators from coup attempts because they reduce elites’ incentives to try to grab power preemptively via forceful means. By assuaging the ambition of some elites who have more to… 

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