• DOI:10.1177/0010414016655538
• Corpus ID: 157014887

Countering Coups: Leadership Succession Rules in Dictatorships

@article{Frantz2017CounteringCL,
  title={Countering Coups: Leadership Succession Rules in Dictatorships},
  author={Erica Frantz and Elizabeth A. Stein},
  journal={Comparative Political Studies},
  year={2017},
  volume={50},
  pages={935 - 962}
}

• Erica Frantz, Elizabeth A. Stein
• Published 1 June 2017
• Sociology
• Comparative Political Studies

Paradoxically, many dictators agree to institutionalized succession rules even though these rules could regulate their removal from office. This study shows that succession rules, like other pseudo-democratic institutions in authoritarian regimes, provide survival benefits for dictators. Specifically, they protect dictators from coup attempts because they reduce elites’ incentives to try to grab power preemptively via forceful means. By assuaging the ambition of some elites who have more to gain with patience than with plotting, institutionalized succession rules hamper coordination efforts among coup plotters, which ultimately reduce a leader’s risk of confronting coups. Based on a variety of statistical models, including instrumental variables regression that addresses potential endogeneity between succession rules and coup attempts, the empirical evidence supports the authors’ hypothesis that institutions governing leadership succession reduce the likelihood that dictators confront coups. This study clarifies one of the ways in which institutions in dictatorships help autocratic leaders survive.