Counterfactuals and Two Kinds of Expected Utility

  title={Counterfactuals and Two Kinds of Expected Utility},
  author={Allan Gibbard and William Harper},
We begin with a rough theory of rational decision-making. In the first place, rational decision-making involves conditional propositions: when a person weighs a major decision, it is rational for him to ask, for each act he considers, what would happen if he performed that act. It is rational, then, for him to consider propositions of the form ‘If I were to do a, then c would happen’. Such a proposition we shall call a counterfactual, and we shall form counterfactuals with a connective ‘☐→' on… Expand
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