Could everything be true?

@article{Priest2000CouldEB,
  title={Could everything be true?},
  author={Graham Priest},
  journal={Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
  year={2000},
  volume={78},
  pages={189 - 195}
}
  • G. Priest
  • Published 1 June 2000
  • Philosophy
  • Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Is everything true? The answer, presumably, is no and there is not likely to be much disagreement about that. But how do you know? To put the issue into focus, suppose that you met someone who took everything to be true. I will call such a person a trivialist. How could you justify your position v i s a vis theirs? 1 The question may seem a rather arcane one, but it is a significant one. For a start, it is significant if you are a dialetheist, that is, i f you believe that some contradictions… 
Observations on the Trivial World
A world is trivial if it makes every proposition true all at once. Such a world is impossible, an absurdity. Our world, we hope, is not an absurdity. It is important, nevertheless, for semantic and
Variation on a Trivialist Argument of Paul Kabay
TLDR
The argument is inspired by a metaphysical (rather than modal-logical) argument of Paul Kabay’s which would have us accept this unpalatable conclusion, though its details bear a closer resemblance to a line of thought developed by Jc Beall.
When seeing is not believing: A critique of priest's argument from perception
In this paper I critically examine an argument proposed by Graham Priest in support of the claim that the observable world is consistent. According to this argument we have good reason to think that
Ådnaton AND MATERIAL EXCLUSION 1
Philosophical dialetheism, whose main exponent is Graham Priest, claims that some contradictions hold, are true, and it is rational to accept and assert them. Such a position is naturally portrayed
Could Everything Be True? Probably Not
Trivialism is the doctrine that everything is true. Almost nobody believes it, but, as Priest (2000) shows, finding a non-question-begging argument against it turns out to be a difficult task. In
Άδύνατον and material exclusion
Philosophical dialetheism, whose main exponent is Graham Priest, claims that some contradictions hold, are true, and it is rational to accept and assert them. Such a position is naturally portrayed
Future Contradictions
A common and much-explored thought is Łukasiewicz's idea that the future is ‘indeterminate’—i.e., ‘gappy’ with respect to some claims—and that such indeterminacy bleeds back into the present in the
Is Dialetheism an Idealism? The Russellian Fallacy and the Dialetheist’s Dilemma
In his famous work on vagueness, Russell named 'fallacy of verbalism' the fallacy that consists in mistaking the properties of words for the properties of things. In this paper, I examine two
Dialetheism in Action: A New Strategy for Solving the Equal Validity Paradox?
This paper starts from the Equal Validity Paradox, a paradoxical argument connected to the so-called phenomenon of faultless disagreement. It is argued that there are at least six strategies for
Prospects for Triviality
In this paper I argue, contra Mortensen, that there is a case, namely that of a degenerate topos, an extremely simple mathematical universe in which everything is true, in which no mathematical
...
1
2
3
...

References

SHOWING 1-5 OF 5 REFERENCES
Beyond the Limits of Thought
1. THE LIMITS OF EXPRESSION 5. NOUMENA AND THE CATEGORIES 8. ABSOLUTE INFINITY 12. THE UNITY OF THOUGHT 15. HEIDEGGER AND THE GRAMMAR OF BEING
Perceiving Contradictions
  • Australasian Journal of Philosophy,
  • 1999
Beyond the Limits of Thought (Cambridge
  • 1995
Later versions were read at the University of Queensland and the University of Western Australia. I would like to thank many people there for helpful comments too, particularly
  • A distant first draft of this paper was read at the Conference on Methods in Philosophy and the Sciences, on Truth and Vagueness, held at the New School, NYC