Costly punishment in the ultimatum game evokes moral concern, in particular when framed as payoff reduction

  title={Costly punishment in the ultimatum game evokes moral concern, in particular when framed as payoff reduction},
  author={Kimmo Eriksson and Pontus Strimling and Per A. Andersson and Torun Lindholm},
  journal={Journal of Experimental Social Psychology},

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