Costly Miscalibration ∗

  title={Costly Miscalibration ∗},
  author={Y. Guo and Eran Shmaya},
We consider an online platform which provides probabilistic forecasts using some algorithm. We introduce a concept of miscalibration which measures the discrepancy between the forecast and the truth. We apply this concept to sender-receiver games in which miscalibration is costly for the sender (the platform). We show that, when the sender’s miscalibration cost is sufficiently high, he can achieve his commitment solution in an equilibrium. Moreover, under some assumption about the… CONTINUE READING

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