Corpus ID: 28453972

Costly Contemplation ∗

@inproceedings{Ergin2003CostlyC,
  title={Costly Contemplation ∗},
  author={H. Ergin},
  year={2003}
}
We study preferences over opportunity sets. Such preferences are monotone if every opportunity set is at least as good as its subsets. We prove a representation theorem for monotone preferences. The representation suggests that the decision maker optimally contemplates his mood before making his ultimate choice from his opportunity set. We show that our model reduces to that of Kreps (1979) when contemplation is costless and to the standard rational model if the agent has no preference for… Expand
22 Citations
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