• Corpus ID: 246015942

Cost Sharing for Connectivity with Budget

@article{Zhang2022CostSF,
  title={Cost Sharing for Connectivity with Budget},
  author={Tianyi Zhang and Dengji Zhao and Junyu Zhang and Sizhe Gu},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2022},
  volume={abs/2201.05976}
}
We consider a cost sharing problem to connect all nodes in a weighted undirected graph, where the weight of each edge represents the cost to use the edge for the connectivity and the cost has to be shared among all connected nodes. There is one node called the source to which all the other nodes want to connect and it does not share the costs of the connectivity. As a node may need to go through other nodes to reach the source, the intermediate nodes may behave strategically to block the… 
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