Corrupt Strategic Argumentation: The Ideal and the Naive

  title={Corrupt Strategic Argumentation: The Ideal and the Naive},
  author={Michael J. Maher},
  booktitle={Australasian Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
  • Michael J. Maher
  • Published in
    Australasian Conference on…
    5 December 2016
  • Computer Science
Previous work introduced a model of corruption within strategic argumentation, and showed that some forms of strategic argumentation are resistant to two forms of corruption: collusion and espionage. Such a result provides a (limited) basis on which to trust agents acting on our behalf. That work addressed several argumentation semantics, all built on the notion of admissibility. Here we continue this work to three other well-motivated semantics: the ideal, naive, and stage semantics. The… 
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