Corrigendum to: Optimal Information Releasing in Multidimensional Public Procurement

  • Nicola Doni
  • Published 2008


This hypothesis was wrong and the mistake was due to a misunderstanding. In fact such a strategy would be optimal if the procurer (P) adopted a first price auction as a selection mechanism. The aim of this note is twofold: in the first place, by taking advantage of our mistake, we want to analyse a new selection policy (S0), in which the P awards the contract on the basis of a reverse, first price, auction. We then compare it with the other two policies analysed in the original paper: multidimensional auction with a private (S2) or public (S3) revelation of the P’s quality evaluation. Subsequently, we give an intuition of how the bidders’ optimal strategy in the S1 game differs from the one indicated in the original paper. p c c F s ds

Cite this paper

@inproceedings{Doni2008CorrigendumTO, title={Corrigendum to: Optimal Information Releasing in Multidimensional Public Procurement}, author={Nicola Doni}, year={2008} }