Corrigendum: ‘If’ and the problems of conditional reasoning [Trends in Cognitive Sciences 13 (2009), 282–287]

  title={Corrigendum: ‘If’ and the problems of conditional reasoning 
 [Trends in Cognitive Sciences 13 (2009), 282–287]
  author={Ruth M. J. Byrne and Philip N. Johnson-Laird},
  journal={Trends in Cognitive Sciences},
Due to a typesetting error, the final line of the text in Box 3 (Suppositional theories and the probability of conditionals), page 284, was omitted. The final sentence in its entirety should read: ‘You represent the strength of your belief as a numerical conditional probability.’ We apologize to the authors and readers of this article for this error. 
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