Correlated-belief equilibrium

  title={Correlated-belief equilibrium},
  author={Elias Tsakas},
  • E. Tsakas
  • Published 1 March 2016
  • Economics
  • Synthese
We introduce a new solution concept, called correlated-belief equilibrium. The difference to Nash equilibrium is that, while each player has correct marginal conjectures about each opponent, it is not necessarily the case that these marginal conjectures are independent. Then, we provide an epistemic foundation and we relate correlated-belief equilibrium with standard solution concepts, such as rationalizability, correlated equilibrium and conjectural equilibrium. 
2 Citations
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