Correlated Equilibrium in Quitting Games

  title={Correlated Equilibrium in Quitting Games},
  author={Eilon Solan and Rakesh V. Vohra},
  journal={Math. Oper. Res.},
A quitting game is a sequential game where each player has two actions: to continue or to quit. The game continues as long as all players decide to continue. The moment at least one player decides to quit, the game terminates. The terminal payoff depends on the subset of players who quit at the terminating stage. If the game continues forever, then the payoff for the players is some fixed-payoff vector.We prove that every quitting game admits a correlated uniform e-equilibrium--a uniform e… 
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  • L. Shapley
  • Mathematics
    Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
  • 1953
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