Corporate governance and firm cash holdings in the US

  title={Corporate governance and firm cash holdings in the US},
  author={J. Harford and Sattar Mansi and W. Maxwell},
  journal={Journal of Financial Economics},
  • J. Harford, Sattar Mansi, W. Maxwell
  • Published 2008
  • Business
  • Journal of Financial Economics
  • Using governance metrics based on antitakeover provisions and inside ownership, we find that firms with weaker corporate governance structures actually have smaller cash reserves. When distributing cash to shareholders, firms with weaker governance structures choose to repurchase instead of increasing dividends, avoiding future payout commitments. The combination of excess cash and weak shareholder rights leads to increases in capital expenditures and acquisitions. Firms with low shareholder… CONTINUE READING
    1,100 Citations

    Tables from this paper

    Corporate Governance and Cash Holdings: Empirical Evidence from an Emerging Market
    • 1
    • Highly Influenced
    • PDF
    Corporate Governance and Cash Holdings: Evidence from Worldwide Board Reforms
    • Highly Influenced


    International Corporate Governance and Corporate Cash Holdings
    • 1,088
    • Highly Influential
    • PDF
    Corporate governance and the value of cash holdings.
    • 1,357
    • PDF
    International Evidence on Cash Holdings and Expected Managerial Agency Problems
    • 549
    • PDF
    Cash and Corporate Control
    • 147
    • PDF
    Corporate Governance and Financing Policy: New Evidence
    • 85
    • PDF
    Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers
    • 18,692
    • PDF
    Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns
    • 1,363
    • PDF
    Do Firms in Countries with Poor Protection of Investor Rights Hold More Cash?
    • 180
    • PDF