Corporate Lobbying and CEO Pay

@article{Skaife2013CorporateLA,
  title={Corporate Lobbying and CEO Pay},
  author={H. A. Skaife and David Veenman and T. Werner},
  journal={Econometrics: Multiple Equation Models eJournal},
  year={2013}
}
  • H. A. Skaife, David Veenman, T. Werner
  • Published 2013
  • Business
  • Econometrics: Multiple Equation Models eJournal
  • This study examines the agency costs of corporate lobbying by exploring the relation between lobbying and excess CEO compensation. We show that CEOs of firms engaged in lobbying earn significantly greater compensation levels compared to CEOs in non-lobbying firms, after controlling for standard economic determinants of pay. The relation between lobbying and CEO pay increases with the intensity of firms’ lobbying. Although lobbying is positively associated future sales growth, we find no… CONTINUE READING
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