Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns

@article{Masulis2005CorporateGA,
  title={Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns},
  author={Ronald W. Masulis and Cong Wang and Fei Xie},
  journal={AFA 2006 Boston Meetings (Archive)},
  year={2005}
}
  • Ronald W. Masulis, Cong Wang, Fei Xie
  • Published 2005
  • Business
  • AFA 2006 Boston Meetings (Archive)
  • We examine whether corporate governance mechanisms, especially the market for corporate control, affect the profitability of firm acquisitions. We find that acquirers with more antitakeover provisions experience significantly lower announcement‐period abnormal stock returns. This supports the hypothesis that managers at firms protected by more antitakeover provisions are less subject to the disciplinary power of the market for corporate control and thus are more likely to indulge in empire… CONTINUE READING
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