Cores of non-atomic market games

@article{Amarante2006CoresON,
  title={Cores of non-atomic market games},
  author={Massimiliano Amarante and Fabio Maccheroni and Massimo Marinacci and Luigi Montrucchio},
  journal={Int. J. Game Theory},
  year={2006},
  volume={34},
  pages={399-424}
}
We study the cores of non-atomic market games, a class of transferable utility cooperative games introduced by Aumann and Shapley [2], and, more in general, of those games that admit a na-continuous and concave extension to the set of ideal coalitions, studied by Einy, Moreno, and Shitovitz [9]. We show that the core of such games is norm compact and some related results. We also give a Multiple Priors interpretation of some of our …ndings. JEL classi…cation: C71, D81