Cores of Cooperative Games in Information Theory

@article{Madiman2008CoresOC,
  title={Cores of Cooperative Games in Information Theory},
  author={Mokshay M. Madiman},
  journal={EURASIP J. Wireless Comm. and Networking},
  year={2008},
  volume={2008}
}
Cores of cooperative games are ubiquitous in information theory and arise most frequently in the characterization of fundamental limits in various scenarios involving multiple users. Examples include classical settings in network information theory such as Slepian-Wolf source coding and multiple access channels, classical settings in statistics such as robust hypothesis testing, and new settings at the intersection of networking and statistics such as distributed estimation problems for sensor… CONTINUE READING
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