Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values

@article{Biran2011CorestableRI,
  title={Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values},
  author={Omer Biran and Françoise Forges},
  journal={Games and Economic Behavior},
  year={2011},
  volume={73},
  pages={52-64}
}
We propose a semi-cooperative game theoretic approach to check whether a given coalition is stable in a Bayesian game with independent private values. The ex ante expected utilities of coalitions, at an incentive compatible (noncooperative) coalitional equilibrium, describe a (cooperative) partition form game. A coalition is core-stable if the core of a suitable characteristic function, derived from the partition form game, is not empty. As an application, we study collusion in auctions in… CONTINUE READING