Core-selecting package auctions

@article{Day2008CoreselectingPA,
  title={Core-selecting package auctions},
  author={Robert W. Day and Paul R. Milgrom},
  journal={International Journal of Game Theory},
  year={2008},
  volume={36},
  pages={393-407}
}
Auctions that select core allocations with respect to reported values generate competitive levels of sales revenues at equilibrium and limit bidder incentives to use shills. Among core-selecting auctions, the ones that minimize seller revenues also maximize incentives for truthful reporting, produce the Vickrey outcome when that lies in the core and, in contrast to the Vickrey auction, and create no incentive for a seller to exclude qualified bidders. Core-selecting auctions are related to and… 

1 Optimal Incentives in Core-Selecting Auctions 1

Optimal Incentives in Core-Selecting Auctions Robert Day, School of Business, University of Connecticut Paul Milgrom, Dept of Economics, Stanford University August 25, 2010 Auctions that select core

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