Core-competitive Auctions

@article{Goel2015CorecompetitiveA,
  title={Core-competitive Auctions},
  author={G. Goel and M. R. Khani and Renato Paes Leme},
  journal={Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation},
  year={2015}
}
One of the major drawbacks of the celebrated VCG auction is its low (or zero) revenue even when the agents have high value for the goods and a competitive outcome would have generated a significant revenue. A competitive outcome is one for which it is impossible for the seller and a subset of buyers to 'block' the auction by defecting and negotiating an outcome with higher payoffs for themselves. This corresponds to the well-known concept of core in cooperative game theory. In particular, VCG… Expand
5 Citations