Coping with the Tragedy of the Commons: Game Structure and Design of Rules

  title={Coping with the Tragedy of the Commons: Game Structure and Design of Rules},
  author={Nicolas Faysse},
  journal={New Institutional Economics},
  • N. Faysse
  • Published 22 March 2005
  • Economics
  • New Institutional Economics
The paper provides an assessment of some recent results of the large amount of New Institutional Economics analyses investigating a common-pool resource setting, with a specific focus on game theory models. Most of the studies have used a non-cooperative approach in order to explain how under-provision for the resource or its over-use - the so-called Tragedy of the Commons - can be avoided, within given management rules. They show how the characteristics of the game (payoff matrix, repetition… 

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  • E. Ostrom
  • Economics
    Journal of Economic Perspectives
  • 2000
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