Coordination in the Static and the Dynamic

@inproceedings{Lee2002CoordinationIT,
  title={Coordination in the Static and the Dynamic},
  author={In Ho Lee},
  year={2002}
}
In this paper, we analyse three factors that are crucial in determining whether equilibrium is unique in coordination games with incomplete information. We show that a unique equilibrium exists if there is sufficiently (i) large uncertainty about the common component of agents’ payoffs; (ii) small degree of strategic uncertainty; and (iii)large differences in agents’ payoffs. We call these three factors fundamental uncertainty, strategic uncertaintyandheterogeneity, respectively. To show the… CONTINUE READING

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