Coordination and equilibrium selection in games: the role of local effects

  title={Coordination and equilibrium selection in games: the role of local effects},
  author={Tomasz Raducha and Maxi San Miguel},
We study the role of local effects and finite size effects in reaching coordination and in equilibrium selection in two-player coordination games. We investigate three update rules – the replicator dynamics (RD), the best response (BR), and the unconditional imitation (UI). For the pure coordination game with two equivalent strategies we find a transition from a disordered state to coordination for a critical value of connectivity. The transition is system-size-independent for the BR and RD… 

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