Coordination and delay in global games

  title={Coordination and delay in global games},
  author={Amil Dasgupta},
  journal={J. Econ. Theory},
  • A. Dasgupta
  • Published 1 May 2007
  • Economics
  • J. Econ. Theory

On the Role of Information and Strategic Delay in Coordination Games: Theory and Experiment ∗

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