Coordination and Status Influence

@article{Clark2006CoordinationAS,
  title={Coordination and Status Influence},
  author={Christopher R. Clark and Samuel J. Clark and Mattias Polborn},
  journal={Rationality and Society},
  year={2006},
  volume={18},
  pages={367 - 391}
}
We develop a model to explain why the influence of higher-status individuals is often accepted even when status is not an indication of superior information or competence. We propose such acceptance as a rational strategy in cases where coordination is important. In our model agents must select from among a set of alternatives after witnessing the choices of some group of initial movers, one of whom is assumed to be of high status. These agents would like to select the better alternative, but… 

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