Coordinating Resistance through Communication and Repeated Interaction *

@inproceedings{Casona2009CoordinatingRT,
  title={Coordinating Resistance through Communication and Repeated Interaction *},
  author={Timothy N. Casona and Vai-Lam Muib},
  year={2009}
}
  • Timothy N. Casona, Vai-Lam Muib
  • Published 2009
Successful deterrence of leader expropriation is important for economic development. This paper studies experimentally how repeated interactions and communication can help deter leaders from extracting surplus from their subordinates. We show that repetition alone is far from sufficient in deterring leader expropriation. Communication between subordinates is critical for increasing coordinated resistance even when the information communicated is highly restrictive. Adding communication reduces… CONTINUE READING
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