Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Game-Theoretic Analyses of Adoptions of Security Policies for DRM

Abstract

Digital Rights Management ecosystem is composed of various participants, which adopt different security policies to meet their own security requirements, with a goal to achieve individual optimal benefits. However, from the perspective of the whole DRM-enabling contents industry, a simple adoption of several increasingly enhanced security policies does not necessarily implement an optimal benefit balance among participants. A game-theoretic analysis of adoptions of security policies was emphasized based on a proposed General DRM value chain ecosystem without the loss of generality. First, we formalized security policies and fundamental properties that include internal relativity and external one, together with multiparty game on adoptions of security policies. Also, a cooperative game among digital

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Cite this paper

@article{Zhang2009CooperativeAN, title={Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Game-Theoretic Analyses of Adoptions of Security Policies for DRM}, author={Zhiyong Zhang and Qingqi Pei and Jianfeng Ma and Lin Yang and Kefeng Fan}, journal={2009 6th IEEE Consumer Communications and Networking Conference}, year={2009}, pages={1-5} }