• Corpus ID: 245877204

Cooperative Security Against Interdependent Risks

  title={Cooperative Security Against Interdependent Risks},
  author={Sanjith Gopalakrishnan and Sriram Sankaranarayanan},
Firms in inter-organizational networks such as supply chains or strategic alliances are exposed to interdependent risks. Interdependent risks are risks that are transferable across partner firms, such as contamination in food supply chains or data breaches in technology networks. They can be decomposed into intrinsic risks a firm faces from its own operations and extrinsic risks transferred from its partners. Firms broadly have access to two security strategies: either they can independently… 
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