Corpus ID: 14025690

Cooperative Institutions for Sustainable Management of Common Pool Resources

@inproceedings{Madani2011CooperativeIF,
  title={Cooperative Institutions for Sustainable Management of Common Pool Resources},
  author={K. Madani and A. Dinar},
  year={2011}
}

K. Madani, A. Dinar

Published 2011

Business

Beneficiaries of common pool resources (CPRs) may select available noncooperative and regulatory exogenous institutions for managing the resource, as well as cooperative management institutions. All these institutions may increase the longterm gains, prolong the life of the resource, and help to escape the tragedy of the commons’ trap. Cooperative game theory approaches can serve as the backbone of cooperative CPR management institutions. This paper formulates and applies several commonly used… CONTINUE READING

wspc.ucr.edu

Save to Library

Create Alert

Cite

Launch Research Feed