Cooperation percolation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game

  title={Cooperation percolation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game},
  author={Han-Xin Yang and Zhihai Rong and Wenxu Wang},
  journal={New Journal of Physics},
The paradox of cooperation among selfish individuals still puzzles scientific communities. Although a large amount of evidence has demonstrated that the cooperator clusters in spatial games are effective in protecting the cooperators against the invasion of defectors, we continue to lack the condition for the formation of a giant cooperator cluster that ensures the prevalence of cooperation in a system. Here, we study the dynamical organization of the cooperator clusters in spatial prisoner's… 

Figures from this paper

Percolation in spatial evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on two-dimensional lattices.

All the observed percolation transitions belong to the universality class of the random percolations, and it is shown how the detailed growth mechanism of cooperator and defector clusters decides each regime.

Diversity of timescale promotes the maintenance of extortioners in a spatial prisoner’s dilemma game

This paper investigates the influence of the strategy-selection timescale on the evolution of extortion and cooperation in networked systems and finds that extortioners can form long-term stable relationships with cooperative neighbors, whereas the lifetime of a defection strategy is short according to the myopic best response rule.

Universal scaling for the dilemma strength in evolutionary games.

Resonance-like cooperation due to transaction costs in the prisoner’s dilemma game

Enhancement of Cooperation and Reentrant Phase of Prisoner’s Dilemma Game on Signed Networks

We studied the prisoner’s dilemma game as applied to signed networks. In signed networks, there are two types of links: positive and negative. To establish a payoff matrix between players connected

Coevolution of aspirations and cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game

Suboptimal outcomes are often more acceptable than the best ones when the latter are hard or even impossible to find. In order to describe the emergence of cooperation when suboptimal alternatives

Peer pressure: enhancement of cooperation through mutual punishment.

This work investigates a symmetric punishment strategy, in which an individual will punish each neighbor if their strategies are different, and vice versa, and finds that the initial density of cooperators plays an important role in the evolution of cooperation driven by mutual punishment.



Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games with voluntary participation.

  • G. SzabóC. Hauert
  • Economics
    Physical review. E, Statistical, nonlinear, and soft matter physics
  • 2002
It is demonstrated that cyclic dominance produces self-organizing patterns on square lattices but leads to different types of oscillatory behavior on random regular graphs: the temptation to defect determines whether damped, periodic, or increasing oscillations occur.

Interaction stochasticity supports cooperation in spatial Prisoner's dilemma.

Simulation results show that there exists an optimal region of the intensity of interaction resulting in a maximum cooperation level, and good agreement between simulation results and theoretical predictions obtained from an extended pair-approximation method is found.

Dynamical organization of cooperation in complex topologies.

In this Letter, we study how cooperation is organized in complex topologies by analyzing the evolutionary (replicator) dynamics of the prisoner's dilemma, a two-player game with two available

Social diversity and promotion of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game.

  • M. PercA. Szolnoki
  • Economics
    Physical review. E, Statistical, nonlinear, and soft matter physics
  • 2008
This work considers different distributions of extrinsic factors that determine the social diversity of players, and finds that the power-law distribution enables the best promotion of cooperation.

Phase transition and hysteresis loop in structured games with global updating.

This work indicates that individuals with more neighbors have a trend to preserve their initial strategies, which has strong impacts on the strategy updating of individuals with fewer neighbors; while the fact that individuals have to become cooperators to avoid gaining the lowest payoff plays significant roles in maintaining and spreading of cooperation strategy.

Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on a square lattice

A simplified prisoner's game is studied on a square lattice when the players interacting with their neighbors can follow two strategies: to cooperate $(C)$ or to defect $(D)$ unconditionally. The

Spatial structure often inhibits the evolution of cooperation in the snowdrift game

The results caution against the common belief that spatial structure is necessarily beneficial for cooperative behaviour, and show that no such general predictions can be made for the effects of spatial structure in the snowdrift game.

Cooperation enhanced by inhomogeneous activity of teaching for evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games

The results highlight the importance of asymmetry characterizing the exchange of master-follower role during the strategy adoptions in evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games with quenched inhomogeneities in the spatial dynamical rules.

Similarity-based cooperation and spatial segregation.

A cooperative game, where the cooperative act is not based on the previous behavior of the coplayer, but on the similarity between the players, and the stabilization of a cooperative fixed point of a forecast rule in the symmetric game, which corresponds to cooperation across segregation borders is studied.

Restricted connections among distinguished players support cooperation.

It is observed that influential individuals must be few and sparsely connected in order for cooperation to thrive in a defection-prone environment and only minute values of p warrant the best promotion of cooperation.