Cooperation over Finite Horizons : A Theory and Experiments

@inproceedings{Ambrus2006CooperationOF,
  title={Cooperation over Finite Horizons : A Theory and Experiments},
  author={Attila Ambrus and Parag A. Pathak},
  year={2006}
}
This paper shows that the presence of different types of players – those who only care about their own material payoffs and those who reciprocate others’ contributions – can explain the robust features of observed contribution patterns in public good contribution games, even without the presence of asymmetric information. We show what conditions on reciprocity are sufficient for a unique perfect equilibrium, in which contributions are decreasing. Under these conditions, selfish players have… CONTINUE READING
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