Cooperation in Threshold Public Projects with Binary Actions

  title={Cooperation in Threshold Public Projects with Binary Actions},
  author={Yiling Chen and Biaoshuai Tao and Fang-Yi Yu},
When can cooperation arise from self-interested decisions in public goods games? And how can we help agents to act cooperatively? We examine these classical questions in a pivotal participation game, a variant of public good games, where heterogeneous agents make binary participation decisions on contributing their endowments, and the public project succeeds when it has enough contributions. We prove it is NP-complete to decide the existence of a cooperative Nash equilibrium such that the… Expand

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