Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma

  title={Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma},
  author={Robert E. Jervis},
International anarchy and the resulting security dilemma (i.e., policies which increase one state's security tend to decrease that of others) make it difficult for states to realize their common interests. Two approaches are used to show when and why this dilemma operates less strongly and cooperation is more likely. First, the model of the Prisoner's Dilemma is used to demonstrate that cooperation is more likely when the costs of being exploited and the gains of exploiting others are low, when… 
From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation
International anarchy and the security dilemma make cooperation among sovereign states difficult. Transformations of balance-of-power systems into concerts tend to occur after large antihegemonic
State-Induced Security Dilemma
The relationship between China and Taiwan is used to elucidate the utility of the state-induced security dilemma and raises important questions regarding the dilemma’s mitigation and escape.
Cooperation, Conflict, and the Costs of Anarchy
  • J. Fearon
  • Economics
    International Organization
  • 2018
Abstract I consider a model in which two states choose how much to arm and whether to attack in successive periods. Arms are useful not only for deterrence or taking territory, but also because they
The Security Dilemma Exercise: Hawks, Doves, and Moles
Abstract A key concept and problem in international relations, the security dilemma obtains when one state's attempts to increase its security decreases the security of other states. The security
The Theory of Games and the Problem of International Cooperation
  • R. Wagner
  • Political Science
    American Political Science Review
  • 1983
The Prisoner's Dilemma game, Rousseau's image of the Stag Hunt, and the concept of a security dilemma have all been used to support the argument that much international conflict is the result of
The Irrelevance of the Security Dilemma for Civil Wars
This article revisits the security dilemma theory and its application to civil conflict. Based on a careful reading of existing studies, it exposes the deviations from the original theory developed
The Security Dilemma Revisited
Robert Jervis's article "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma" is among the most important in international relations in the past few decades. Nevertheless, relatively little effort has been
Conflict And Cooperation in International Relations
Neorealist theories of international relations, particularly when formalized as noncooperative games, have difficulty accounting for substantial cooperation between nation-states, perhaps because
The Calculus of the Security Dilemma
Some scholars known as offensive realists claim that in the uncertainty of world politics, trust and cooperation between states is extremely unlikely. Others, such as defensive realists , claim that
Contested strategies: China, the United States, and the Indo-Pacific security dilemma
  • Joel Wuthnow
  • Political Science
    China International Strategy Review
  • 2019
The Sino-U.S. security dilemma is driven, in large part, by concerns in both countries about the regional strategies being pursued by the other. U.S. analysts worry about the implications of China’s


The Strategy of Conflict.
I. Elements of a Theory of Strategy 1. The Retarded Science of International Strategy 2. An Essay on Bargaining 3. Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War II. A Reorientation of Game Theory 4.
The Resolution of Conflict
SUMMARY The paper deals with the resolution of conflict by bargaining, a term which is defined broadly. It is more concerned with the actual results of bargains than "fair" results, and discusses
Arms and Influence
Traditionally, Americans have viewed war as an alternative to diplomacy, and military strategy as the science of victory. Today, however, in our world of nuclear weapons, military power is not so
The Illusion of Limited War: Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg's Calculated Risk, July 1914
The responsibility for the outbreak of World War I weighed heavily upon Imperial Germany's fifth Chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg. “This war torments me,” he confessed to the Liberal Conrad
Deterrence in 1939
Rather than a case where deterrence was not tried, 1939 is a case where deterrence failed. As such, it has important implications for deterrence theory. Mutual deterrence must operate on roughly the
The future of conventional arms control
Dramatic changes in conventional military capabilities coupled with nuclear parity should greatly increase the importance of conventional military power as well as raise new opportunities and
The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1909-1922
In this continuation of his study of the interrelationship of naval and diplomatic policies, Braisted picks up the story in 1909 with the inauguration of President Taft and ends with the Washington
Prisoner's Dilemma
The game nicknamed ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ by A.W. Tucker has attracted wide attention, doubtless because it has raised doubts about the universal applicability of the so called Sure-thing Principle as
The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897-1909
Professor William R. Braisted tells the story of the twelve important years during which the U.S. Navy won an undisputed place as a major force in the Pacific. Believing that the study of U.S. naval
Perception and misperception in international politics
This study of perception and misperception in foreign policy was a landmark in the application of cognitive psychology to political decision making. The New York Times called it, in an article