Cooperation, Repetition, and Automata

@inproceedings{Neyman1995CooperationRA,
  title={Cooperation, Repetition, and Automata},
  author={Abraham Neyman},
  year={1995}
}
This talk studies the implications of bounding the complexity of players' strategies in long term interactions. The complexity of a strategy is measured by the size of the minimal automaton that can implement it. A nite automaton has a nite number of states and an initial state. It prescribes the action to be taken as a function of the current state and its next state is a function of its current state and the actions of the other players. The size of an automaton is its number of states. The… CONTINUE READING

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