Cooperation, Punishment, and the Evolution of Human Institutions

  title={Cooperation, Punishment, and the Evolution of Human Institutions},
  author={Joseph Henrich},
  pages={60 - 61}
Given the choice, people prefer institutional arrangements in which those who overconsume common-property resources are punished compared to those in which they go free. 
The evolution of sanctioning institutions: an experimental approach to the social contract
A vast amount of empirical and theoretical research on public good games indicates that the threat of punishment can curb free-riding in human groups engaged in joint enterprises. Since punishment is
Social Inequality and the Evolution of Human Social Organization
This volume on the emergence of inequality brings a renewed perspective, through varied lenses, at questions surrounding the origins of modern human social organization. In 1995 we edited a volume
Ostracism is one form of real-life punishment mechanism to penalize uncooperative individuals in many societies. This paper aims to test whether ostracism enhances cooperation in the public good
Social norms, costly punishment and the evolution of cooperation
Within a co-evolutionary framework of reputations, strategies and social norms, we study the role of punishment in the promotion of cooperation. Norms differ according to whether they allow or do not
Sustainable institutionalized punishment requires elimination of second-order free-riders
  • M. Perc
  • Economics
    Scientific reports
  • 2012
It is shown that pool-punishment in structured populations is sustainable, but only if second-order free-riders are sanctioned as well, and to a such degree that they cannot prevail.
With God We Trust: Religion, Trust and Cooperation in Large-Scale Societies
The first aim of this paper is to revisit the puzzle of cooperation in large-scale societies.It proposes a game theoretic model showing how endogenous emotion-based punishment can sustain ull
A Study on the Effects of Reputation-based Decision on the Dynamics of Public Goods Game with Punishment , Signaling and Gossiping Mechanisms
In public goods game individuals contribute in favor of a common benefit. However this attracts free-riders, who profit the benefits generated by the group regardless their contribution decision.
Simulating the effects of sanctioning for the emergence of cooperation in a public goods game
The results show that individuals who contribute to a sanctioning institution are better off after several repetitions of the game, despite the costs associated with sanctioning.
Altruistic Punishment: A Consumer Response to Service Failure
Despite the efforts of organizations to perform their services properly, being able to eliminate all possible errors is highly improbable. When service failures occur, they tend to involve some level


The Competitive Advantage of Sanctioning Institutions
It is shown experimentally that a sanctioning institution is the undisputed winner in a competition with a sanction-free institution, demonstrating the competitive advantage of sanctioning institutions and exemplify the emergence and manifestation of social order driven by institutional selection.
Why people punish defectors. Weak conformist transmission can stabilize costly enforcement of norms in cooperative dilemmas.
In this paper, we present a cultural evolutionary model in which norms for cooperation and punishment are acquired via two cognitive mechanisms: (1) payoff-biased transmission-a tendency to copy the
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
This paper provides evidence that free riders are heavily punished even if punishment is costly and does not provide any material benefits for the punisher. The more free riders negatively deviate
The evolution of reciprocity in sizable groups.
Group beneficial norms can spread rapidly in a structured population.
It is shown that when a model of imitation used to derive replicator dynamics in isolated populations is generalized to allow for population structure, group beneficial norms can spread rapidly under plausible conditions.
Evolution of cooperation by reciprocation within structured demes
The iterative two-person Prisoners’ Dilemma game has been generalised to theN-person case and the evolution of cooperation is explored by matching the Tit For Tat (TFT) strategy against the selfish strategy.
Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem
It is shown that the threat of exclusion from indirect reciprocity can sustain collective action in the laboratory, and that such exclusion is evolutionarily stable, providing an incentive to engage in costly cooperation, while avoiding the second-order free rider problem.
Costly signaling and cooperation.
It is shown that honest signaling of underlying quality by providing a public good to group members can be evolutionarily stable, and can proliferate in a population in which it is initially rare, provided that certain plausible conditions hold.
Microeconomics: Behavior, Institutions, and Evolution
Preface ix Prologue: Economics and the Wealth of Nations and People 1 Part I: Coordination and Conflict: Generic Social Interactions 21 Chapter One: Social Interactions and Institutional Design 23