Cooperation, Punishment, and the Evolution of Human Institutions

  title={Cooperation, Punishment, and the Evolution of Human Institutions},
  author={Joseph Henrich},
  pages={60 - 61}
Given the choice, people prefer institutional arrangements in which those who overconsume common-property resources are punished compared to those in which they go free. 

The evolution of sanctioning institutions: an experimental approach to the social contract

A vast amount of empirical and theoretical research on public good games indicates that the threat of punishment can curb free-riding in human groups engaged in joint enterprises. Since punishment is

Social Inequality and the Evolution of Human Social Organization

This volume on the emergence of inequality brings a renewed perspective, through varied lenses, at questions surrounding the origins of modern human social organization. In 1995 we edited a volume


Ostracism is one form of real-life punishment mechanism to penalize uncooperative individuals in many societies. This paper aims to test whether ostracism enhances cooperation in the public good

Social norms, costly punishment and the evolution of cooperation

Within a co-evolutionary framework of reputations, strategies and social norms, we study the role of punishment in the promotion of cooperation. Norms differ according to whether they allow or do not

Response—Evolution of Fairness

It is argued that understanding the massive expansion of cooperation in the past 10 millennia and the diversity of human sociality requires the integration of work on both cultural and genetic evolution.

Sustainable institutionalized punishment requires elimination of second-order free-riders

  • M. Perc
  • Economics
    Scientific reports
  • 2012
It is shown that pool-punishment in structured populations is sustainable, but only if second-order free-riders are sanctioned as well, and to a such degree that they cannot prevail.

With God We Trust: Religion, Trust and Cooperation in Large-Scale Societies

The first aim of this paper is to revisit the puzzle of cooperation in large-scale societies.It proposes a game theoretic model showing how endogenous emotion-based punishment can sustain ull

A Study on the Effects of Reputation-based Decision on the Dynamics of Public Goods Game with Punishment , Signaling and Gossiping Mechanisms

In public goods game individuals contribute in favor of a common benefit. However this attracts free-riders, who profit the benefits generated by the group regardless their contribution decision.

Punishment and inspection for governing the commons in a feedback-evolving game

A coevolutionary model where beside the payoff-driven competition of cooperator and defector players the level of a renewable resource depends sensitively on the fraction of cooperators and the total consumption of all players is considered.



The Competitive Advantage of Sanctioning Institutions

It is shown experimentally that a sanctioning institution is the undisputed winner in a competition with a sanction-free institution, demonstrating the competitive advantage of sanctioning institutions and exemplify the emergence and manifestation of social order driven by institutional selection.

Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions

A reorientation of game theory in which players are not hyper-rational and knowledge is incomplete is suggested; a simple adaptive learning process is proposed; and this framework is applied to the study of social and economic institutions.

Why people punish defectors. Weak conformist transmission can stabilize costly enforcement of norms in cooperative dilemmas.

In this paper, we present a cultural evolutionary model in which norms for cooperation and punishment are acquired via two cognitive mechanisms: (1) payoff-biased transmission-a tendency to copy the

Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments

This paper provides evidence that free riders are heavily punished even if punishment is costly and does not provide any material benefits for the punisher. The more free riders negatively deviate

The evolution of reciprocity in sizable groups.

Group beneficial norms can spread rapidly in a structured population.

It is shown that when a model of imitation used to derive replicator dynamics in isolated populations is generalized to allow for population structure, group beneficial norms can spread rapidly under plausible conditions.

Evolution of cooperation by reciprocation within structured demes

The iterative two-person Prisoners’ Dilemma game has been generalised to theN-person case and the evolution of cooperation is explored by matching the Tit For Tat (TFT) strategy against the selfish strategy.

Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem

It is shown that the threat of exclusion from indirect reciprocity can sustain collective action in the laboratory, and that such exclusion is evolutionarily stable, providing an incentive to engage in costly cooperation, while avoiding the second-order free rider problem.

Costly signaling and cooperation.

It is shown that honest signaling of underlying quality by providing a public good to group members can be evolutionarily stable, and can proliferate in a population in which it is initially rare, provided that certain plausible conditions hold.

Microeconomics: Behavior, Institutions, and Evolution

Preface ix Prologue: Economics and the Wealth of Nations and People 1 Part I: Coordination and Conflict: Generic Social Interactions 21 Chapter One: Social Interactions and Institutional Design 23