Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion Under Dictatorships

@article{Gandhi2006CooperationCA,
  title={Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion Under Dictatorships},
  author={Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski},
  journal={Political Institutions: Non-Democratic Regimes eJournal},
  year={2006}
}
  • J. Gandhi, A. Przeworski
  • Published 1 March 2006
  • Economics
  • Political Institutions: Non-Democratic Regimes eJournal
Dictatorships are not all the same: some are purely autocratic but many exhibit a full panoply of seemingly democratic institutions. To explain these differences, we develop a model in which dictators may need cooperation to generate rents and may face a threat of rebellion. Dictators have two instruments: they can make policy concessions or share rents. We conclude that when they need more cooperation dictators make more extensive policy concessions and share fewer rents. In turn, when the… 

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