Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does it Work?

@article{Oechssler2008CoolingOffIN,
  title={Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does it Work?},
  author={Joerg Oechssler and Andreas Roider and Patrick W. Schmitz},
  journal={CEPR: Labour Economics (Topic)},
  year={2008}
}
Negotiations frequently end in conflict after one party rejects a final offer. In a large-scale internet experiment, we investigate whether a 24-hour coolingoff period leads to fewer rejections in ultimatum bargaining. We conduct a standard cash treatment and a lottery treatment, where subjects receive lottery tickets for several large prizes - emulating a high-stakes environment. In the lottery treatment, unfair offers are less frequently rejected, and cooling-off significantly reduces the… 

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