• Corpus ID: 238583583

# Convex-Concave Min-Max Stackelberg Games

@inproceedings{Goktas2021ConvexConcaveMS,
title={Convex-Concave Min-Max Stackelberg Games},
author={Denizalp Goktas and Amy Greenwald},
booktitle={Neural Information Processing Systems},
year={2021}
}
• Published in
Neural Information Processing…
5 October 2021
• Computer Science
Min-max optimization problems (i.e., min-max games) have been attracting a great deal of attention because of their applicability to a wide range of machine learning problems. Although signiﬁcant progress has been made recently, the literature to date has focused on games with independent strategy sets; little is known about solving games with dependent strategy sets, which can be interpreted as min-max Stackelberg games. We introduce two ﬁrst-order methods that solve a large class of convex…
13 Citations

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