Convergence to perfect competition of a dynamic matching and bargaining market with two-sided incomplete information and exogenous exit rate

@article{Satterthwaite2008ConvergenceTP,
  title={Convergence to perfect competition of a dynamic matching and bargaining market with two-sided incomplete information and exogenous exit rate},
  author={Mark Satterthwaite and Artyom Shneyerov},
  journal={Games and Economic Behavior},
  year={2008},
  volume={63},
  pages={435-467}
}
Consider a decentralized, dynamic market with an infinite horizon and incomplete information in which buyers and sellers' values for the traded good are private and independently drawn. Time is discrete, each period has length [delta], and each unit of time a large number of new buyers and sellers enter the market. Within a period each buyer is matched with a seller and each seller is matched with zero, one, or more buyers. Every seller runs a first price auction with a reservation price and… CONTINUE READING
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