Convergence in the Finite Cournot Oligopoly with Social and Individual Learning

@inproceedings{Valle2009ConvergenceIT,
  title={Convergence in the Finite Cournot Oligopoly with Social and Individual Learning},
  author={Thomas Vall{\'e}e and Murat Yildizoglu},
  year={2009}
}
Convergence to the Nash equilibrium in a Cournot oligopoly is a question that recurrently arises as a subject of controversy in economics. The development of evolutionary game theory has provided an equilibrium concept more directly connected with adjustment dynamics, and the evolutionary stability of the equilibria of the Cournot game has been extensively studied in the literature. Several articles show that the Walrasian equilibrium is the stable ESS of the Cournot game. But no general result… CONTINUE READING