Convergence and Hardness of Strategic Schelling Segregation

@article{Echzell2019ConvergenceAH,
  title={Convergence and Hardness of Strategic Schelling Segregation},
  author={Hagen Echzell and Tobias Friedrich and Pascal Lenzner and Louise Molitor and Marcus Pappik and Friedrich Sch{\"o}ne and Fabian Sommer and David Stangl},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2019},
  volume={abs/1907.07513}
}
The phenomenon of residential segregation was captured by Schelling's famous segregation model where two types of agents are placed on a grid and an agent is content with her location if the fraction of her neighbors which have the same type as her is at least $\tau$, for some $0<\tau<1$. Discontent agents simply swap their location with a randomly chosen other discontent agent or jump to a random empty cell. We analyze a generalized game-theoretic model of Schelling segregation which allows… Expand
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