Controlling Elections by Replacing Candidates or Votes

@inproceedings{Loreggia2015ControllingEB,
  title={Controlling Elections by Replacing Candidates or Votes},
  author={Andrea Loreggia and Nina Narodytska and Francesca Rossi and Kristen Brent Venable and Toby Walsh},
  booktitle={AAMAS},
  year={2015}
}
We consider elections where the chair replaces either candidates or votes, with the goal of making a specific candidate win (constructive control) or lose (destructive control). We call this “replacement control” and study its computational complexity for several scoring rules (plurality, veto, Borda, k-approval), as well as for approval voting. 
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