Control without Deception : Individual Behaviour in FreeRiding Experiments Revisited

  title={Control without Deception : Individual Behaviour in FreeRiding Experiments Revisited},
  author={Nicholas Bardsley},
Lying to participants offers an experimenter the enticing prospect of making “others’ behaviour” a controlled variable, but is eschewed by experimental economists because it may pollute the pool of subjects. This paper proposes and implements a new experimental design, the Conditional Information Lottery, which offers all the benefits of deception without actually deceiving anyone. The design should be suitable for most economics experiments, and works by a modification of an already standard… CONTINUE READING
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