Contribution Games in Networks

@article{Anshelevich2011ContributionGI,
  title={Contribution Games in Networks},
  author={Elliot Anshelevich and Martin Hoefer},
  journal={Algorithmica},
  year={2011},
  volume={63},
  pages={51-90}
}
  • Elliot Anshelevich, Martin Hoefer
  • Published 2011
  • Mathematics, Computer Science
  • Algorithmica
  • We consider network contribution games, where each agent in a network has a budget of effort that he can contribute to different collaborative projects or relationships. Depending on the contribution of the involved agents a relationship will flourish or drown, and to measure the success we use a reward function for each relationship. Every agent is trying to maximize the reward from all relationships that it is involved in. We consider pairwise equilibria of this game, and characterize the… CONTINUE READING

    Citations

    Publications citing this paper.
    SHOWING 1-10 OF 21 CITATIONS, ESTIMATED 97% COVERAGE

    Efficiency and the Redistribution of Welfare

    VIEW 11 EXCERPTS
    CITES BACKGROUND & RESULTS
    HIGHLY INFLUENCED

    Strategic Network Formation Through an Intermediary

    VIEW 2 EXCERPTS
    CITES METHODS

    Stable Matching with Network Externalities

    VIEW 4 EXCERPTS
    CITES BACKGROUND

    Strong Price of Anarchy and Coalitional Dynamics

    VIEW 4 EXCERPTS
    CITES BACKGROUND
    HIGHLY INFLUENCED

    Incentives and Efficiency in Uncertain Collaborative Environments

    VIEW 2 EXCERPTS
    CITES BACKGROUND & METHODS

    Friendship and Stable Matching

    VIEW 3 EXCERPTS
    CITES BACKGROUND

    FILTER CITATIONS BY YEAR

    2011
    2019

    CITATION STATISTICS

    • 3 Highly Influenced Citations

    References

    Publications referenced by this paper.
    SHOWING 1-10 OF 42 REFERENCES