Contracts vs. preferences over colleagues in matching

  title={Contracts vs. preferences over colleagues in matching},
  author={Francis Flanagan},
  journal={Int. J. Game Theory},
Francis Flanagan Wake Forest University Abstract I introduce a general many-to-one matching framework which includes the matching with contracts model as well as models of matching with preferences over colleagues as special cases. I show that this general model can be embedded into the model with contracts, thus the models are equivalent, and all results from the many-to-one matching with preferences over colleagues literature can be applied to the model with contracts. 
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Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues

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Milgrom . Matching with contracts

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