Contracts versus Salaries in Matching

@inproceedings{Echenique2012ContractsVS,
  title={Contracts versus Salaries in Matching},
  author={Federico Echenique},
  year={2012}
}
594 Workers and firms may bargain over general, multidimensional contracts; they may negotiate over health benefits, housing, retirement plans, etc. Substitutes, on the other hand, is the assumption commonly placed on firms’ preferences to guarantee the existence of stable matchings of workers and firms. In this paper I show that, when firms regard contracts as substitutes, bargaining over contracts can be embedded into a model of bargaining over wages. The economics of the embedding is… CONTINUE READING
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