Contracts as Bilateral Commitments: A New Perspective on Contract Modification

@article{Jolls1997ContractsAB,
  title={Contracts as Bilateral Commitments: A New Perspective on Contract Modification},
  author={Christine Jolls},
  journal={The Journal of Legal Studies},
  year={1997},
  volume={26},
  pages={203 - 237}
}
  • Christine Jolls
  • Published 1 January 1997
  • Economics
  • The Journal of Legal Studies
Contracts have traditionally been regarded as means of individual commitment. This article offers a broader vision, viewing contracts as potential means of bilateral commitment as well. Drawing on a burgeoning literature in economics, this article explains that commitment to stick with an original contract, even if both parties later want to modify that contract, may improve contractors' welfare. It provides examples from contracts cases of situations in which such bilateral commitment may be… 
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