Contracts and domination in incomplete markets
@inproceedings{Marakulin2003ContractsAD, title={Contracts and domination in incomplete markets}, author={Valeriy M. Marakulin}, year={2003} }
A domination concept, based on the notion of an exchange contract, is proposed and studied in this paper. Doing so, the classical notion of domination via coalitions is transmitted onto systems (webs) of contracts and onto allocations, whose stability is investigated. This way, the proposed concept of a core for incomplete markets is described as a set of allocations realized by the webs of contracts that have a special kind of stability relative to the breaking of existing contracts and… CONTINUE READING
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