Contracting with Repeated Moral Hazard and Private Evaluations

Abstract

A repeated moral hazard setting in which the Principal privately observes the Agent’s output is studied. The optimal contract for a finite horizon is characterized, and shown to require burning of resources. These are only burnt after the worst possible realization sequence and the amount is independent of both the length of the horizon and the discount… (More)

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@inproceedings{Fuchs2005ContractingWR, title={Contracting with Repeated Moral Hazard and Private Evaluations}, author={William Fuchs}, year={2005} }